ing legislation concerning research on human subjects. 9 Justifying her role in the forty-year Study, Miss Evers declares: "I loved those men .... [they] were susceptible to kindness." 10 The Tuskegee Study reappears periodically in public discourse, most recently in 1995 when President Clinton's nominee for Surgeon General, Dr. Henry Foster, Jr., was alleged to have participated in the StudyY Dr. Foster's critics, and even some scholars, have questioned whether he knew of the Tuskegee Study when he was a practicing physician in Tuskegee in 1969. The nagging questions about Dr. Foster suggest that there are important lessons to learn from reexamining the Study, even twenty-five years after a panel of experts made recommendations that they believed would prevent future abuses of patients or subjects. 12 The Tuskegee Study acts as precedent even though there is no traditional case law involving the Study. 13 Tuskegee's legacy is 9 . FELDSHUH, supra note 3, at 93. 10. Id (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 25, 1995) . Moreover, Fred Gray, attorney for the subjects, has stated that his investigation did not indicate that Dr. Foster had any knowledge of the Study while it was being conducted. See id. 12. See FINAL REPORT OF THE TusKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY, supra note 2, at 23-47. 13. Society seems to have accepted that something "bad" happened during the Tuskegee Study, but some scholars have taken great literary license with the facts. For instance,Jack Kevorkian, the outspoken proponent of legalizing physician assistance in dying and a longtime advocate of allowing experimentation on prisoners condemned to death, stated the following about the Tuskegee Study:
The wartime medical crimes [referring to the Nazi concentration-camp experiments] were one result. The ethical sickness had spread to the United States even before World War II, but evidence of it surfaced only after the war, when in 1981 a horrible experiment on syphilis in Tuskegee, Alabama, was described in detail. It involved a nontherapeutic study of 399 syphilitic black prisoners and 201 uninfected black prisoners who served as "controls." None of the subjects was asked their consent or knew what was happening. jACK KEvORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION MEDICIDE: THE GoODNESS OF PLANNED DEATH 170 (1991) (citations omitted). In his zeal to argue the inadequacy of the modem code of ethics for human experimentation, Kevorkian might have ignored the difference between tenant farmers and prisoners in describing what in fact happened in the Tuskegee Study.
grander because it was a stimulus to the current model of regulating human experiments-the "institutional review board" 14 -and the prevailing model of professional ethics, which is grounded in a subject's consent. 15 Within this model, monetary compensation is often proffered as a solution after a subject is injured or killed in the course of human research, 16 or when it is discovered that an individual did not consent to being the subject of human research. 17 Mter a lawsuit was filed in 197 4, 18 the federal government agreed to compensate the subjects of the Tuskegee Study. 19 Examining the terms of this settlement will make society less willing to embrace the concept that paying for suffering resolves the deep public policy issues that human experimentation presents.
The Tuskegee legacy has also helped to shape the latest govern- 
This Report suggests
Another explanation for the creative license taken with the facts of the Tuskegee Study is that issues associated with race are easily distorted. See NussBAuM, supra note 7, at 93-97 (discussing the effects of a reader's race on his ability to judge Bigger Thomas's thoughts and actions in Richard Wright's Native Son). Feldshuh, for instance, has mentioned in conversations with this Author that he has encountered African-American actors who have stated categorically that the government actually "gave" syphilis to the tenant farmers in Macon County.
14. See generaU.y 42 U.S.C. § 289 (1994) (providing that any entity applying for a federal government biomedical research grant for studies that use human subjects must establish a review board "to protect the rights of the human subjects of such research").
15. Human Radiation Experiments, it is apparent that the legal response to the Tuskegee Study provided the Radiation Committee with a framework in which monetarily compensating "victims" of modern medical progress is accepted as the appropriate governmental response. 22 Despite the similarity between the government's response to the Tuskegee Study and the Human Radiation Experiments, providing governmental compensation to victims is only one of several alternative responses to the persistent public policy problem of human experimentation.23 In fact, other responses must be considered as we move toward a conceptualization of the appropriate social functions of science, medicine, and law.
In reviewing the Tuskegee Study for institutional lessons, commentators must resist the prevailing view that the physicians and scientists involved in the Study were bad or even racist; this view blinds scholars to the ineffectiveness of our present legal response to human experimentation. 24 Although society may not be susceptible to the kindness of a caring public health nurse such as the fictionalized Nurse Evers, 25 it may be susceptible to a religious-like faith in medical progress and legal utilitarianism when confronting human suffering. 26
I. THE TUSKEGEE STUDY: COMPENSATION BY SETrLEMENT
Mter the Tuskegee Study became the subject of media reports, Fred Gray, who has had a long history of involvement in civil rights 21 . ld. at 512. The Radiation Committee recommended financial compensation for the subjects (or their surviving immediate family members) for whom the experiments provided no prospect of direct medical benefit or who had been misled into believing that controversial interventions were actually standard practice. Id. at 513. Furthermore, the Committee recommended that the compensation be adequate to cover relevant medical expenses and associated harms, including pain and suffering, loss of income, and disability. Id. 
The subjects of the study were racially selected: only black men were used as subjects in the study. . . . Plaintiffs allege that the black subjects were selected and used in the experiment, a program of controlled genocide solely because of their race and color in violation of their rights, secured by the Constitution and Laws of the United States.
34. ld. at 1. In his book, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, james jones writes: The Tuskegee Institute, for which Gray served as the general counsel, was not named in the suit. Neither was the Veterans Hospital. The local health department and the Macon County Medical Society also escaped legal notice. In fact, no predominantly black institution was named in the suit. The same was true of individuals; all of the individually named defendants were white. No black physicians were mentioned; neither were any black nurses. joNES, supra note 2, at 216.
[VoL. 56:604 segregated medical profession and society mitigated their legal culpability. 35 He believed that race had a greater explanatory force than notions of professionalism, which might have encompassed both the Caucasian and Mrican-American professionals over the forty-year period of the Study. 36 Mter numerous pretrial maneuvers, the lawyers for the plaintiffs and the United States Government reached a monetary settlement in which each surviving subject received $37,500, each heir or representative of a deceased subject received $15,000, each of the "controls" received $16,000, and the heir or representative of each control received $5,000 from the $10 million settlement paid by the federal govemment.
37
In retrospect, Gray's theory of racial selection as the starting point for a legal analysis of human experimentation seems unwise. His theory fails to account for the importance of institutional arrangements as an explanation of what happened to his clients 38 -the Caucasian public health physicians named as defendants in the lawsuit relied upon Mrican-American physicians to refer syphilitic patients to the Public Health Service for over forty years.
39 These Mrican-American physicians should at least be viewed as co-investigators, rather than as anonymous Mrican-American professionals victimized by "the system." 40 Were any of these local physicians subject to suits for malpractice based on their failure to offer penicillin as a treatment option after it was discovered to be a cure for syphilis? 41 Although the "lack o-: informed consent doctrine" 42 had 
A. Good People, Bad Institutional Arrangements?
In a scene from the play, Miss Evers' Bays, Dr. Brodus, the administrator and head of the hospital at the Tuskegee Institute, examines one of the men in the Study-one of Miss Evers' Boys-in 1946 after penicillin had been discovered.
46 Both Nurse Evers and Dr. Douglas, the Caucasian physician from the United States Public Health Service, are present and participate in various conversations about whether, after fourteen years, the men should be given the choice of using penicillin for their advanced stages of syphilis. 47 On the one hand, Dr. Brodus is somewhat of a modem hero when he questions Dr. Douglas about the desirability of allowing the men to decide for themselves whether to take the risks of using penicillin for their advanced syphilis. 48 On the other hand, when he is questioned by Nurse Evers, Dr. Brodus uses a form of racial and professional paternalism to justify continuation of the Study without telling the men about the availability of penicillin. 49 When Nurse Evers pleads on behalf of the tenant farmers, Dr. Brodus shouts back in anger: "You think you're the only person who feels? You got your burden and I got mine. You serve the race in your way. I serve it in mine. I can't rock the boat while I'm trying to keep a people from drowning." 50 It is apparent that Dr. Brodus is concerned about future funding for his hospital, one of the few resources of modem health care for African Americans in his community. He is also concerned about his role as a research scientist to his liberal (by mid-1940s standards) colleague, Dr. Douglas. 5 1 It is also apparent that Dr. Brodus has a highly individualistic vision of his social role. While some commentators in the video, Susceptible to Kindness: Miss Evers' Bays and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, see Dr. Brodus as caught up in the system, others suggest that the socioeconomic difference between him-an educated professional-and the patients-illiterate tenant farmers-prevents him from seeing the possible harm to the individual patients. 52 In some respects, Drs. Brodus and Douglas are like many modem professionals-unable to sort out how the mixture of personal and profes- [VoL. 56:604 sional ethics, and perhaps professional ambition, influences their decisions.
The four hundred African-American males involved in the Tuskegee Study were originally gathered at the beginning of the Great Depression to receive free medical treatment for syphilis. 53 The United States Public Health Service and a private philanthropy created a partnership 54 to bring some measure of health care to rural African Americans in the then-prevailing practice of fee-for-service medicine. 55 The individual within the Public Health Service who decided that monitoring the men was appropriate once foundation funds were no longer available is unknown. In the play, Miss Evers' Bays, Dr. Douglas is at least idealistic in the sense that he tries to save the treatment program in 1932 after the funds are withdrawn. 56 He is professionally committed to providing health care services to the most underserved population of his day. 5 7 For many years, no one among his professional colleagues questioned the appropriateness of Dr. Douglas's actions. Although no moral conflict is apparent in Dr. Douglas's character, if we try to imagine ourselves in a totally segregated society, would any of us necessarily have experienced moral conflict at the time?
The fictional Nurse Evers helps us to recall that prior to the discovery of penicillin, syphilis was classified as a "chronic illness."
58 At that time, popular culture had not yet become infused with the modem notion that every human affliction, such as cancer, multiple sclerosis, lupus, diabetes, and AIDS, is subject to cure. Currently, new treatments that prolong life or ameliorate the symptoms of those with chronic illnesses only reinforce the notion that a cure is just around the comer. Research on diet, violence among youth, or the Ebola viius in Zaire only encourages the belief that science can stop these epidemics and provide solutions to these current plagues.
It would be a mistake simply to focus on Nurse Rivers because of her continuity with the Tuskegee Study or because her role has been artistically immortalized through the character of Nurse Evers in Miss Evers' Bays. Trying to imagine the ethical dilemmas from her perspec- tive does, however, shed light on the institutional arrangements among science, medicine, gender, race, and law over time.
Our ethics-starved modem minds reason that the discovery in the 1940s of penicillin as a cure for syphilis required public health officials to provide treatment to all of the men in the Tuskegee Study. For those public health workers who had labored for years to provide some care to the medically neglected, however, the miracle drug had yet to be tested in the reality of medical practice in the rural America of the Deep South-a reality that would today be labeled as a problem of "access" to health care services. For the public health care workers servicing a portion of the public not yet infused with the dreams of scientifically based medicine, the risks of penicillin loomed much larger than its benefits. 5 9 This wholly paternalistic vision of the professionals' right to decide the hard ethical questions for "their" patients was not incompatible with the ethos of the entire profession prior to the mid-1960s. 60
B. Institutional Lessons
The first lesson to learn from the Tuskegee experiment is a cautionary one. Before commending or condemning professional behavior, we should better understand the forces, particularly the conceptions of knowledge, that drive professional behavior. One of these forces is the belief that understanding the nature of disease and its transmission helps determine the optimal use of health resources. 61 We all benefit from continued drug research; in plain terms, we now know that penicillin and other antibacterial drugs change the nature of bacteria, which requires new antibacterial drugs. Today, the methods for investigating the effectiveness of drugs and disease progression involve research on viruses, bacteria, and genes using methodologies that were simply unknown sixty years ago. Research may involve using certain populations to aid scientists' efforts to isolate the molecular or genetic nature of breast cancer or alcoholism, for example, or to determine why some isolated populations have certain incidences of disease.62 Because of the nature of scientifically based medicine, research involving human subjects will continue. Perhaps we have become so accustomed to the possible health care benefits of genetic research that we sometimes fail to understand the complex ethical dilemmas associated with modem scientific research. The recently reported higher incidence of diabetes among Mrican Americans 63 led to speculation that there may be a genetic "cause" of diabetes. 64 In our zest to find cures in these discoveries, alternative explanations-for example, that the high incidence of diabetes is due to environmental conditions of the fetus and thus correlates with the mother's social and economic status-are nearly drowned out of public discourse. 65 Compared with the ethical quandaries of biotechnological developments, the Tuskegee Study, in retrospect, appears simple.
The other lesson for science and medicine is easy to state, but difficult to explain. Most scientists and professionals are ambivalent about the relationship of race to their work. The Tuskegee researchers wanted to know if syphilis took a different course in Mrican Americans than in Caucasians. 66 Lurking underneath that line of inquiry was whether biological differences among races meant that the medical response to the individual patient should consider this demographic factor. Lest we label as "racists" the researchers who might have asked those questions, we should recall how reluctant modem scientists are to admit that forensic DNA data are kept by race 67 
I d.
In the absence of clear legal boundaries, we are at risk of developing a de facto national eugenics policy after all, not because we wish to identify and then eliminate people as undesirable members of "lesser races," but because some alleles will be considered undesirable by organizations in a position to limit their replication.
65. See id. at 9.
66. See joNES, supra note 2, at 27-28.
67
. After a DNA sample is obtained and matched to that of a criminal suspect, the final step in compiling forensic DNA evidence is to determine the statistical probability that the crime scene sample came from someone other than the suspect. See Ranajit REv. 1274 REv. , 1288 REv. -1300 REv. (1995 (discussing the debunking of the theory that substructuring affects DNA probability estimates).
Contrary to its purely scientific facade, the compilation of DNA evidence is prone to various subjective forces. Determining which racial databases will be used and presented to juries, based on the probability that the suspect will be of a particular race, involves speculation and, most likely, social prejudice. See Barry C. Scheck, DNA and Daubert, 15 CARoozo L. REv. 1959 REv. , 196466 (1994 [VoL. 56:604
clients' position for settlement. He did not have a theory of the responsibility of individuals for the institutional arrangements in which they operated. Most significant, Gray did not consider whether his role as general counsel to the Tuskegee Institute might have blinded him to a theory of organizational responsibility for the harm to his clients. 71 His theory of the role of race is perhaps understandable in our post-1960s optimism, in which courts are the primary public policy makers on racial matters. 72 Lawyers who were crafting settlements and drafting legislation in the aftermath of the public outrage over the Tuskegee Study might have operated without a conception of the relationship of law to the institutions of modern science and medicine. 73 Such an institutional conception is all the more necessary today, when modern medical research, particularly in its quest for the genetic understanding of health and disease, has heightened the ability of professionals to "play the God Game" because of patients' faith in medical progress.
74
The Tuskegee Study raises questions beyond the obvious ethical impropriety of not obtaining informed consent for a study involving human subjects. That is, we need to consider whether the medical and legal professionals involved in the Study were in fact "good" individuals who were unable to see that they practiced under "bad" institutional arrangements. We must refocus on the Tuskegee Study to learn how legal encounters with human experimentation can help us to devise the best institutional arrangements between law, medicine, and modern science.
II. THE REGUlATORY MODEL
A. Cost 74. See RoTHMAN, supra note 15, at 247-62 (discussing the relationship between the regulation of medical research and patient trust in physicians and hospitals); see also KATZ, supra note 23, at 185-91 (discussing the authoritative status and high degree of autonomy accorded to professionals in a technologically advanced society).
Act of 1974. 75
The Act left two clear, permanent marks on the national discourse regarding the use of human subjects. First, and most significant, the Act authorized the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare to issue regulations governing federally funded research. 76 The pillar of this regulatory system was the institutional review board and its supposed capacity to supervise the giving of consent.
77 Under this system, the members of the institutional review board would assist the investigator in her cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the use of human subjects was appropriate.78 Without this institutional assurance, federal funds for the proposed research would be denied. 79 Current regulations governing federally sponsored research evolved from the authority granted under the Act. 80
The second feature of the Act was the establishment of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects, designed to advise Congress and the executive about policies regarding the use of human subjects. 81 Although the Commission's mandate has expired,82 similar groups have become a feature of our national political life. 83 "Commissioning Ethics" became a political compromise between those who sought specific legal restrictions on physicians' and scientists' use of human subjects and those who opposed such restrictions. 84
B. Adjudication After Political Equilibrium
Formation of a multidisciplinary group to address a cns1s in human experimentation does not require congressional action. periments,87 we learned officiallyB 8 of other government-sponsored research involving patients and research subjects. The Committee's Report chronicled the fifty-year history of experiments on the effects of human radiation, and like previous government reports on human experiments, it recommended that the government pay the individuals who were unknowing participants in government-sponsored scientific experiments. 89 This payment would not be for the physical harm caused by the experiment, but rather for the "indignity" of being experimented upon without consent. 90 In effect, the Committee asked itself: "Should we compensate those who suffer for medical progress?" and answered the question with a resounding, if somewhat lengthy: "Yes."
I have no objection to Congress's enacting legislation to provide financial compensation to some of the subjects of government-sponsored human radiation experiments. Government compensation, however, should not be a complete bar to individual recovery. Political solutions, ultimately, are compromises in any sense, but we should recognize the imperfections of previous political solutions, such as the National Research Act of 1974. 91 In a separate individual statement, one member of the Radiation Advisory Committee, Jay Katz, who was also a member of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Study Panel, expressed his disappointment with the failure to develop a national policy on the use of human subjects. 92 Katz's doubts about the capacity of institutional review boards within research organizations to re- solve policy conflicts is symptomatic of a larger societal problem.
93
The political equilibrium 94 we have achieved on human experimentation is fragile and subject to disruption by public events, such as the media report of secret government radiation experiments. 95 Although revelations of past human experimentation may bring media attention and congressional hearings, they do not necessarily produce new legislation or court opinions that change the present structure. Legislation enacted in the aftermath of the Radiation Advisory Committee's Report should leave open the possibility of individual lawsuits.
The litigation surrounding the radiation experiments at the University of Cincinnati General Hospital warrants close attention because it tells a story about modem human subject research. 96 First, although it has been known for some time that radiation experiments took place for many years at Cincinnati General Hospital, until recendy the identities of the patients were not known.
97 One might assume that the connection of these experiments to military efforts and professional notions of confidentiality may have cloaked the subjects' 
See
In re Cincinnati Radiation, 874 F. Supp. at 804. The complaint alleged that until a newspaper reporter revealed the names of some of the subjects in January 1994, the plaintiffs' counsel had no way of knowing whether their representatives had been subjects in radiation experiments. See id. identities in a veil of secrecy. Clearly, medicine's connection with the military war efforts skewed the "ethics" of physicians. 98 Second, most of these subjects were "poor," some were charity cases, and most were Mrican American. 99 There is some similarity between the legal theories used by the plaintiffs in the Cincinnati lawsuit and the complaint filed after the Tuskegee Study in that they both alleged violations of constitutional rights. 100 The trial judge in In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation 101 denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. 102 I wonder, however, if the trial judge who refused to dismiss the complaints brought on behalf of the deceased, indigent, and mostly Mrican-American patients might have been motivated by another feature of modern medicine-the tendency to forget its harms or its failures. Those who died from cancer twenty years ago at the University of Cincinnati Hospital, 103 for instance, are of little historical interest because we believe that they would have died regardless of our actions, 104 and because we claim to have learned lessons from our mistakes that will benefit future patients.
One wonders if society has become so accustomed to human research that it has accepted a view of medical progress grounded in notions of "cure" and "death." Given the advances of biomedical research, it is hard to imagine that there is harm and suffering that has been hidden from public view, such as in the Tuskegee and Human Radiation Studies. Perhaps individual lawsuits by actual victims are reminders that the harms of modern scientific medicine are notal-ways immediately visible. Sometimes the harm from powerful and otherwise beneficial drugs is intergenerational; the litigation over diethylstilbestrol (DES) is one such example. 105 At other times, the social context of medicine does not allow individual physicians and scientists to see individual harm, as in both the Tuskegee and Human Radiation examples. 106 For instance, determining whether radical surgery for certain cancers is more beneficial than the alternatives requires years of longitudinal studies.
We should explore the relevant competence of adjudicative, legislative, administrative, and market processes to deal with the problem of human experimentation. 107 Market forces-medicine, science, and how individuals respond to them-are the predominant forces that shape whether investigators view the risks to human subjects as worth taking. 108 Administrative or legislative responses to problems of human experimentation are likely to be dominated by the forces of medicine and science as illustrated by the National Research Act of 1974. 109 Thus, judicial decisionmaking in human experimentation should aim to shape the institutional processes of medicine and science by recognizing its own limitations. An individual lawsuit such as In re Cincinnati Radiation gives only a skewed distribution of the possible harms and benefits of atomic research. 110 The regulatory processes developed over the past twenty years to deal with human experimentation might actually have increased the amount of human experimentation, as well as the growth of new cures and greater life expectancy. There is also the concomitant growth in the possibility for individual pain and suffering. Perhaps nothing so blatantly shocking as the Tuskegee Study would happen now, but other such events [VoL. 56:604 are happening and will again happen. m This is why institutional analysis is so critical.
It is difficult to judge the effects of the post-Tuskegee regulatory scheme. I do not believe that the problem is seen as determining the optimal amount of human experimentation. Neither legislative nor adjudicative processes are very good at determining how much human experimentation is socially desirable, although each might offer some incentives or disincentives towards optimization. Despite the reports on human experimentation, we have not yet developed an adequate institutional analysis of human experimentation because our quest has been a search for bad professionals rather than bad institutional arrangements. The search for bad professionals is perhaps a job for the legislature, if it would ever consider imposing criminal sanctions for certain types of human experiments.
112 It is unlikely that criminal sanctions are going to be enacted in this country, as we are all so dependent upon physicians. 113 The hope is that law will create incentives for modern physicians to see themselves as institutionally embedded. Were physicians to see themselves as so embedded, their educational system would offer them opportunities to explore the ethical nexus between law, medicine, and science as they constantly revisit the challenges of modern medicine, including the effect of the changing social and economic context. 111. See generaUy Leonard W. Schroeter, Human Experimentation, the Hanford Nuclear Site, and judgment at Nuremberg, 31 GoNz. L. REv. 147 (1995 REv. 147 ( -1996 (discussing the development of law regarding human radiation experimentation).
112. The "crime against humanity" from the Nuremberg trial, for instance, has never been enacted into domestic law. Furthermore, in the few instances in which prosecutors have tried to use existing homicide statutes to question physicians' actions regarding patients, courts have established high barriers to criminal liability. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488-89 (Ct. App. 1983) (expressing the court's disappointment with the legislature's inaction to provide a proper framework for deciding ethical medical issues); see also PALMER, supra note 15, at 99-107 (discussing the recent unsuccessful attempts in California to prosecute criminally physicians for removing a life-support system from a critically ill patient).
113. See KATz, supra note 15, at 209 (explaining the intense bonds that patients unilaterally form with their doctors).
114. SeeP ALMER, supra note 15, at 42-43. Ten years ago, the hospital was the most important organizational structure for physician practice. See id. at 42. Most people, even members of the medical community, considered hospitals as simply places where doctors treated patients. See id. With greater recognition of the role of the hospital as a forum for research came safeguards against the moral risks inherent in human research. See id. at 43. With the advent of managed care, the social and economic structure of medicine is undergoing radical change that requires a rethinking of the traditional model of patient consent as the ethical imperative of modem practice.
